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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
disposed to read in the requirement that due diligence in attempting
personal delivery of the summons precede the express alternatives
of section 735, there seems ample basis for finding such require-
ment in section 735 itself without becoming tied up with section
308(3). Section 735 permits its alternative of substituted service
to be used only "if service cannot be made in such manner" (i.e.,
in the manner in which a summons is served). One would
naturally assume the use of due diligence in attempting such ser-,,ice
before it could be concluded that such service "cannot be made."
The better construction of the opening language of section 735
is that it intends to refer only to subdivision (1) of section 308,
i.e., to require an effort at personal delivery. The original service
of summons provision sought to be embraced by that reference has
been so changed (as it now appears as section 308) as to make
impractical an effort to give section 735 its original intent; and
imputing to the section an intent to adopt all of the present section
308. When, at the premises, service cannot be made thereunder
of section 735 creates that weird situation in which there is then
involved two entirely separate, yet very similar, substituted service
provisions, each involving its own conditions precedent and its own
distinctions as to method.
The proceeding is supposed to be "summary." If it is to
retain its summary function, then the opening language of section
735 should be read as a reference only to subdivision (1) of section
308. When, at the premises, service cannot be made thereunder
by personal delivery, service should be permissible by the alterna-
tives expressly set forth in section 735, and no further reference
should be made to section 308 or its alternatives. And service by
the section 735 alternatives should be sufficient for both possession
and for rent due, without distinction between them. However, prior
law may have come by its distinctions in that regard, there appears
to be no support for them in the present RPAPL.
Counterclaim Permitted in Holdover Proceeding
In Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger,2 66 a holdover summary
proceeding by the landlord, defendant tenant sought to interpose an
portion of litigation in our state. The ambiguities that create the problem
are readily traceable to their source. The RPAPL is the product of the
Law Revision Commission; the CPLR is the work of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Practice and Procedure and, later, of the Senate Finance Committee.
While the earlier reports of the Advisory Committee indicate some kind
of effort at coordination regarding all the provisions involved, that early
rapport was later lost. The result is that the final RPAPL as done by
the Law Revision Commission was insufficiently coordinated with the final
CPLR as it came out of the Senate Finance Committee, and the chief
product of that loss of rapport is the problem we have been discussing here
regarding service.
266246 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1964).
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equitable counterclaim. Under Section 1425 of the CPA counter-
claims were not permitted in holdover proceedings, although they
were allowed in non-payment of rent cases.
The court found that the restrictive language of Section 1425
of the CPA was not incorporated in Section 743 of the RPAPL,
and held that counterclaims may be interposed in any summary
proceeding whether the proceeding be for non-payment or for
holding over.
Although the desire for quick disposition of landlord and
tenant matters restricts the utilization of counterclaims, the court
noted that "where it is so intertwined with the defense as to
become part and parcel thereof, '26 7 the counterclaim should be
entertained in the same proceeding. However, where the counter-
claim does not bear upon the question of whether the landlord is
entitled to immediate possession of his property, the counterclaim
should be severed and sent off as a separate action or proceeding.
Thus, a counterclaim for negligence resulting in personal injuries
interposed by the tenant in a summary proceeding should be sev-
ered from the proceeding.
MVAIC
Clause in Endorsement Reducing Award Held to Violate Policy
Behind MVAIC
The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation [here-
inafter refered to as MVAIC] was created to provide compensation
for innocent persons injured by an uninsured motorist.268  The
courts have sought to uphold this broad purpose in a number of
recent decisions.
In Durrant v. MVAIC, 269 petitioner was involved in an acci-
dent with an uninsured automobile. He was covered by the New
York Automobile Accident Indemnification endorsement contained
in his employer's policy and hence was an "insured" person under
the MVAIC law.2 7 0 The endorsement contained the standard clause
reducing MVAIC's liability by such workmen's compensation as
may have been received by the insured for the same injuries.
Petitioner filed his claim with MVAIC. The arbitrator refused to
reduce the award by the amount of workmen's compensation re-
ceived by the petitioner, finding that the Legislature did not intend
that MVAIC should have the power through its right to draw the
267 1d. at 812.
268 N.Y. INS. LAW § 600(2); McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35,
38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.
2d 101 (1963).
26920 App. Div. 2d 242, 246 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1964).
270N.Y. INs. LAW § 601(i).
